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1. Introduction 
In this paper we continue the study of tbrcing in model theory ini- 
tiated in A.Robinson [6], The present paper can be read independently, 
although we shall quote without proofs some results from the t;arlier 
paper. 
Our starting point is a notion of forcing which is patterned closely 
after that introduced into set theory by Paul J.Cohen, except that it is 
formulated relative to a fixed set K of axioms of a first order langciage 
L (Section 2). This leads naturally (in Section 3) to the definition of 
K-generic str, ctures (in deference to comnaon usage in set theory al- 
though the term "generic" is less appropriate in our setting). If the 
language L is countable then the set Kf of sentences true in all K-generic 
models is called the forcing companion of K and r,ay or may not in- 
clude the original set K. There is a more general definition of K¢ which 
applies also to uncountable L. We study K-generic models and Kf in sec- 
tions 3 and 4, the main result being the characterization f K-generic 
structures obtained in Theorem 3.4. A corollary is that every model of 
KS is K-generic if and only if to.J is model complete. 
It is shown in [61 that if K is countable and possesses a model com- 
pletion K* (cf. [51, p. 128) then K* is logically equiv~tlent to Kf. This 
is extended here to general K. Other examples of K¢ are given in section 
5. In particular, it is shown there that if K = K N is the set of sentences 
true in the natural numbers N then N is (up to isomorphism) the only 
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K-generic model. Thus K£ = K N . Sometimes the problem of identifying 
Kf  for a given K is closely related to difficult questions in standard 
model theory. For example, we have not beer able to determine K.r for 
the case where K is the set of  axioms for Peano arithmetic. Some other 
open questions are ment ioned in section 8. 
We would like to express our appreciation to Paul Eklof, Ed Fisher, 
Gabriel Sabbagh and especially to Eli Bers lbr many interesting and 
helpful discussiol~s on the subject of this paper. Th,;s research was part- 
ially supported by NSF Grant GP-8625. 
2. Framework 
The starting points for our discussion is a first order language L with 
equality symbol = and possibly with cert 1in other relation symbols 
R, S .. . .  ; function symbols / ,  g, ... ;and constant symbols a, b, c . . . .  
The language L also has variables x, y ,  z,  ... and logical symbols  ^ ,  v, 
and :l. The set of te rms of L is defined inductively as usual: each vari- 
able and constant is a term, and if t I ... t,, are terms andf i s  an n-ary 
function symbol then f ( t ,  . . . ,  t n ) is a term. A c losed  term is a term in 
which no variable occurs. An atomic  lb rmula  is of  one of the forms: 
R(t I , ..., t n ) where R is an n-ary relation symbol and t 1 ... t ,  are terms, 
or (t 1 = t 2 ) where t I and t 2 are terms. The formulas of L are defined 
inductively using the logical symbols A, v,  -1 and ::1. Thus we are treat- 
ing the universal quantif ier V and other propositional connectives as 
defined. The not ion of sub fo rmula  is defined so that in particular every 
term occurring in a subform,fla of ~ occurs in ~0 and ~ is a subformula 
of itself. A sentence  is a formula without free variables and a basic sen- 
tence  is a sentence which ;s either atomic or the negation of an atomic 
sentence. A theory  of L is a consistent set K of sentences of L. 
Structures for the language L are ~airs (M, F) where M is a nonempty 
set and F assigns relaticns, funct ionsand ir~dividuals of M to the non- 
logical symbols of L. Vie use M to denote tiffs structure and R M , fM 
and a M , etc., for F(R'~, F ( f )  and F(c), etc. The equality symbol is always 
interpreted by the id :ntity relation. 
Given L and a set A of constant symbols we let L(A) be the expanded 
language whose non ogical symbols are those of  I, plus the constant 
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symbols in A. By a normal expansion <!" L we mean a language L(A ) 
where A is an infinite set of constant syntbols not in L. 
Let M be a structure for L. We inm)duce a sI ecru[ definition of the 
notion of a diagram for M depending on the fact that M may include 
functions. We call a subset X of M a set of  generators for M if no proper 
substructure of M contains X" that is, if M is the closure of X u { c M • c 
a constant symbol of L } under the functions of M. An assignment of  
const, nts to M is a pair (A, G) where A is an infinite set of constant 
symbols not in L and G is a map of  A into M such that {G(a) • a ~ A } 
is a set of  generators for M. Thus, interpreting a by G(a), every element 
of M i'; denoted by at least one closed term of L(A). For a fixed assign- 
ment (A, G) of constants to M, the diagram of M, D(A,G)(M) or D(M), 
is the set of basic sentences of L(A) true in M. 
We come now to the definit ion of  forcing. This definit ion is relative 
to a fixed theory K of L (held constant hrouglaout this section) and a 
fixed set A of constant symbols not in L. A condition of  L(A) relative 
to K is a finite set P of basic sentences of L(A) such that K u P is con- 
sistent. Let C = C(K, A ) be the set of all condit ions of L(A) relative to 
K. We define P forces ~a (ira L(A)relative to K), in symbols P It- ~0, for 
condit ions P ~ C and sentences ~0 of  L(A) by induction on the com- 
plexity of  sentences. (Complexity is a well founded relation defined so 
that the complexity of 3x ~0(x) is greater than the complexity of ¢(t) 
for any term t.) 
2. I, If ~o is atomic then P It- ¢ if and only if vo ~: P. 
2.2. P 11-- (vo ^  q') if and only i fP  It- ~ and P II- q< 
2.3. P II-- (~0 v q, ) if and only if P II-- ¢ or P It- ,I,. 
2.4. P It- :1~: ¢(x) if and only if there is a closed term t of L(A ) such 
that P It- ~0(t), 
2.5. P ll-- -7 ~ if and only if there is no Q ~ C with P c Q such that 
Q II-- ~0. 
The following result (Theorem 2.3 of  [61 ) allows us to be careless 
about the set A of constant symbols. 
15. F ~..~. Let L(A) and L(A ) be normal expansions of  L with A c_ A . Then 
for any sentence ~of  L(A ) and any P ~ C(K, A ), P It- ~ in L(A ) 
relative to K if  and only if P It- ~ in L(A ') relative to K. 
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We thus assume that we are working in a fixed normal expansion L' 
of  L which contains an inexhaustible supply (say a proper class) of con- 
stant symbols and write P I1-- ~ relative to K to mean P II-- ,p in L' rela- 
tive to K. 
The following l~mmas are familiar from set theory and are easy to 
establish in our se, l~ting (compare [6] ): 
2.7. A condition ~:' cannot force both ~ and -q so. 
2.8. l f  P I~ so and P c_ Q then Q IF- so. 
2.9. I re  ~ P then P I~- so. l f  P i~- so where so is basic' then P w, {so} is a 
condition. 
We say that P Jbrces so weaMy. P II-- * so, if P II-- -3--I ¢. 
2. I 0 I re  I~ so then P I~-* so. 
2.11. l f  P I~-* 7 so then P II-- so. 
Another property of  weak forcing, familiar from set theory, will turn 
out to be important later. Given a condit ion P we let K[[P]  be the set 
of sentences of L weakly forced by P. We write Kr for Kf[¢ ]. Kf  is 
called the forcing companion of K. 
2.1 _. ~ IJ'~ sentence so o f  L is a logical consequence o f  K.t[P] ,qten 
so E K / [P I .  In particular. K t[p] is consistent. 
Proof. The second statement follows from the first and 2.7. We consider 
a com) lete  set of  axioms and rules for L and show by induction on the 
length of proofs, that for all P, if so(x! ... x , )  is provable using axioms in 
Kf[P] then for any closed terms t I ... t ,  of  L', P It-* so(t 1 ... t' n ). The set 
of axioms and rules we use is that of Bell and Slomson r 1 ] modif ied by 
requiring ¢ to be atomic in PC 11. The usual argument shows teat this 
modif ied set of axioms still suffices for completeness. The axioms are 
routine but tedious to verify, so let us consider the rules of generalizzt- 
tion and modus ponens. Suppose that 'q' x so is provable from KI[P] be- 
cause so is provable from Kf [P ] .  Let t 1 ... t,~ be closed terms of L'. We 
need to show P Ib* Vx  s0(x, t I ... t,, ); i.e., that 
P II-* -l 3x  -I so(x, t I ... t n ). If not, then there is a condit ion Q c_ p and 
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a term t such that Q tk- q ~(t ,  t I ... t,j) by 2.11 and 2.4. B~t by induc- 
tion, P ft-* ¢(t ,  t I ... t , )  which contradicts 2.7. For modus ponens, sup- 
pose that ~ and ~, --* ,v are provable from K.f[P]. We have to show that 
for any closed terms t 1 ... t n of L(A), P I1-* q'(t 1 ... t n ). So let P c Q 
where Q is a condit ion. We need to find a condit ion Q' _3 Q such that 
Q' ik- q'(t 1 ... t,~). Now by induction, P IH* ¢(t t ... t,~)and 
P I~* ¢(tl  ... t , )  -~ q,(t I ... t n) so there is a Q' 3_ Q such that 
Q' IH -q s0(t 1 ... t~,) or Q' IH q ' ( t  1 ... tn ) .  
The second alternative must hold since P II- qq  ~o(t I ... tp~ ) and P c Q ' .  
This completes the proof. 
2.13. Let  P = I'(a 1 ... a , )  be a cond i t ion  and let ~ = ~(a 1 ... a,t ) be a sen- 
tence o f  L' such that P I~ ~, where  we h~ve d isp layed  all the constants  
a 1 ... a n o f  L' - L oc~'urring ~,n e i ther  P or ~. Let  t~ ... t n be any  c losed 
terms orE '  and let P' = P(t I ... t,,) and ~' = ¢( t  I ... tn).  I f  P'  is a condi -  
t ion then P' II--* ¢'. 
Proof. Let ,I, be -lq ~ so that P IH q' and let ,I,' be -1-3 ~o'. Assume that 
P' is a condit ion. If we can show P' II--* q" then P' I1-* ~0' by 2.11. So 
suppose Q [t-- q q" for some condit ion Q _D p. Let al .-. a,~ be distinct 
new constants not in Q or q,' and let/3 = P(/~l ".. 2/,,), ~/, = ,I,(h 1 ... ~/,,) so 
that P It- ~ .  Then QI = Q o P to {al = tl ... a,, -- t,~ } is a condit ion 
which forces 
3x  1 ... 9x  9.v I ... 3y , :  [ 'P (x  I ... x , , )  ^ 
--I ~(Y l  ""Yn)AXl  =Yl  A... AXn =Yn ] " 
This contradicts 2.12. 
in the remainder of  this section we present some lemmas whose im- 
portance will be seen in the later sections. Given a model M for the 
lan:~uage L we can assume that there is an assignment CA, G) to M such 
that L(A) c_ I_.'. We say that M is cons is tent  w i th  the theory  K of L i fM 
can be embedded in some model of K. This is equivalent to saying that 
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K o D(M) is consistent, which in turn is equivalent to the statement 
that every finite P c D(M) is a condit ion relative to K. 
2.14. Definition. Given a model M consistent with K and given an assign- 
ment (A, G) of  constants to M, we define E(M) to be the set o f  all for- 
mulas q, of  L such that for all subformulas ¢(x I ... x,~) of  q, and for all 
closed terms t 1 ... t n o f  L(A): 
M I',- ~o(tl -.- t ,  ) if and only i fP  ll- ,p for some finite P ~ D(M). 
We show in 2.17 that  ~(M)  is independent  o f  tile part icular  assign- 
ment  (A, G) to M used. First, however ,  we prove the fo l lowing lemma" 
2.1 5. Fbr any model M consistent with K. Z (M) contains all atomic aml 
negated atomic fort.,tulas o f  L and is closed under/x,  v attd 3. 
Proof.  Since A is inf in i te we know by 2.6 that  forc ing in L(A ) is the 
same as forc ing in L'. If  ¢ is a tomic  then ¢ ~ X just  by the def in i t ion  o f  
forcing. Suppose ¢ is-1 q, where  ,I, is atomic ,  l f  M P -1 ,I,(t I ... t n) then 
P Ik- --1 "4,(t l ... t , )  by 2.9, where  P = { -I ,P(t 1 ... t,t } . P is a cond i t ion  
since M is cons is tent  wi th  K. If P II- -7 ,I, (t i .-. t,,) tbr  some P ~ D(M) 
then M ~ -1 q,(t  I ... t,,) for o therwise  Pu  {q,(t  I ... t,,)} would  be a 
cond i t ion  extend ing  P and forc ing ,-I, It i ... t n ), cont rad ic t ing  2.5. Sup- 
pose that  ~, ,I, 6 Z(M)  and let us si~ow that  (~; ,'~ q,) 6 X(M). If 
M ~ ¢( t  I ... t,,) A q,(t  1 ... t , )  then  M ~ ~0(t I ... t,,) and M ~ q,(t 1 ... t , )  
so there are cond i t ions  P, Q c_ D(M) such that  P ll-- ¢ ( t l  ... t , )  and 
Q It- q ' ( t  1 ... t,~). Then  P u Q is a cond i t ion  (since M is consistt:nt wi th  
K) wh ich  forces ¢( t  t ... t,z) A,I, (t I ... t.z). The  converse is similar, as is 
the case for showing  (vo v ,I,) ~ Z(M).  Final ly,  let us suppose  ~ E ~(M)  
and show that  for any variable x. (=i x ~) ~ ~2(M). It is at this po in t  that  
we use the fact that  forc ing in L(A ) is the same as forc ing in L'. For  
suppose P IH : Ix ¢(x,  t I ... t,~) tbr some P ~ D(M). Then  by 2.6, there 
is a closed term t o f  L(A) such that  P IH ~;(t. t I ... t,,). But then since 
~ X(M), M P ~(t,  t I ... t , )  so M ~ : Ix ¢(x,  t I ... t,,). The converse is 
evident.  This completes  the proo f  o f  2.15. 
An existential jbrmula is one bui lt  up f rom atomic  formulas  and 
negated a tomic  formulas  us ing/x ,  v and B. 
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2. i 6. Corollary. Given a model  M consistent with K and an assignme~zt 
(A~ G) ~'o M, then for  any existential sentence ¢ o f  L(A), M ~ ¢ if and 
only (I'P It- ~ .for some finite P c D(M). 
We can use 2.15 to shoe that Z(M) is independent of  the assignmept 
(.4. G> of co~astants o M. For the statement of 2.17 let us use E(A,c~)(M~ 
for ~S (M) as defined above, lhus indicating its apparent dependence on 
(A, G). 
2. l 7. Let M be consistent w~th K and let (A l, G l} and (A 2, G2) be 
assignments o f  cc, nstants to M. Then ~ (A z,G~ )(M) = ~; (a,  .G2) (M)" 
Proof. We may assume that ~A 1 n A z) = ~ and L(A 1 u A 2) c_ L'. It 
clearly suffices by 2.1 5 to stlow that i f¢  e E(A:,G1)(M)N Z(A2,G2)(M )
and -1 ¢ E Z(~I~,G~)(M} then -7 ¢ E Z(Az,t;2)(M ). Tht~s let ~0 = ~(x t ... Xn) 
and let t I -.- t be closed terms of L(A 2). We have to show that 
M ~ --1 v(t I ... t n) if and only i fP  It- -1 v(t I ... t n) for some finite 
P ~ D(..1,.G2)(M). The sufficiency of the condit ion is immediate since 
G Z(A,,Gz}(M). Suppose that M P -1 ~(t 1 ... t,,). If we can show tliat 
there is a P ~ D<A2.G,)(M) wh:,ch forces -1 ~(t I ... t,,) weakly, then we 
ca~ apply 2.11 to conclude 2.17. So let q,(b 1 ... b m) be- t~( t  I ... t n) 
where b t ... b m are the constants from A 2 occurring in the various t i. 
For simplicity, let us assume m = [ and write b for b I . Let t b be a 
closed term of L(A ~) denoting Gz(b), Thus M D q,(tt,) and hence there 
is a P c 1)( .~ ,G~)(M) such that P It- ~'(tb), since -'t ~ ~ Z~A ~ ,G~)(M). Let 
P' be the result of  replacing any constant a ~ A ~ occurring in P by a 
closed term t of L(A 2) denoting G~ (a). Then P' II--* q,(b) by the same 
argument used in 2.13. 
The following consequence of 2.16 shows that for universal sentences, 
forcing coincides wi lh logical consequence. A universal formula is one of 
the form -I q, where q, is existential. We use I- to denote the relation of 
logical consequence. 
2.18. Let ~ be a universal sentence o f  L'. Then ./'or any condition P, 
P IF- ~ if and only if  K o P t-- ~o. 
Proof.  Suppose  that q, is an existent ia l  sentence o f  [,' and that P II--- --I ~I, 
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for some condi t ion P. Let M be a structure for L' which is a model  Of 
K u P. If M ~ q~ then for some Q c D(M), Q II-- ,,If by 2.16 so that 
P u Q is a condi t ion extending P and forcing ",I,, contradict ing 2.5. For  
the converse suppose P does not  force 7 q, so that some Q D P forces q,. 
Thus  we can find a model  M o f  K u Q and, by 2.15, M ~ q,. Hence -7 q, 
is not  a logical consequence of  K w Q and a fortiori, not o f  K w P. 
It fol lows f rom 2.18 that if ~ is universal and K t- ¢ then 4~ I~ ~ so 
so ~ Kf. It can happen,  as we shall see, that for more compl icated so, 
K k- so but 7 so ~ Kf. It is thus reassuring to see that only the universal 
consequences of K really matter .  We define K v to be the set o f  universal 
sentences soof  L such that K I-- so. 
2.19. Theorem. Let  so be any sentence o f  L' and P a f in i te  set o f  basic 
sentences o f  L'. Then P is a cond i t ion  relative to K i f  and only  i f  P is a 
condi t ion relative to K V and  P tk- so relative to K i f  and  only  ~f P I~- so 
relative to K V. In particular, KI = (K,q)f. 
Proof. Let L' = L(A). Since forcing is entirely determined by the set o f  
condit ions it suffices to show that C(K, A ) = C(K V, A ). Since C(K, A) c_ 
c_ C(Kv  ' A ) is clear we need only show that any P ~ C(K v,  A) is con- 
sistent with K. Let P = {so! ... son } and let so(c t °.. c k) be so! A . .  A sok 
where c 1 ... c k are the constants in P not in L. If K u P is not  consistent 
then K k- 7 3v  I ... qv  k ~(V 1 ... Ok) SO'-]  2]01 .., 30  k so(O 1 ... 0 k)  is in 
K V, so P is not consistent with K,q. 
2.20. Let  P = P(a 1 ... a n) be a cond i t ion  and let ¢ = ¢(a I ... a,,) be a sen- 
tence o f  L' such that P II--* ¢, where a I ... a n are all the dist inct  con- 
stants o f  L ' -  L occurr ing ht either P or  ~. Then the fo l low ing  sentence 
o f  L is in K f: 
Vx  I ... x n [ AP(x  I ... x, , ) -~ SO(x I ... Xn)l , 
where A P(A" 1 ... Xn)  is the con junct ion  o f  all the fi~rmulas q, (x I ... x n) 
gotten by replacing a I ... a n by X 1 ... X n ill some qJ E P. 
Proof. By 2.11 it suffices to prove that ~ forces the following: 
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-'1 :Ix 1 ... 3x,, -1 [ -7 A P(.v~ ... x,,) v-3q ¢(.v I .... x',,)] . 
If not, there is a condit ion Q and terms t I ... t ,  of  L' such that 
Q t~- -1 [ -3 A P(t  I ... t,,) v -7-7 so(t! ... t,,)] . 
I fP( t  I ... t , )  u Q were consistent with K, then it would torce 
-3-1 so(tj ... t,,) by 2.13 and hence it would force [ -1 A P(t~ ... t , , )A 
A-1-1 so(t 1 ... t,~)]. Thus K u Q I-- -7 AP( t  1 ... t,~). But then by 2.16, 
Q I~- -3 A P(t~ ... t,,) and hence Q 1}- [ -1 AP( t  1 ... t,,) v so(t I ... t,,)] 
which is a contradiction. 
3. Generic structures 
Let L and L' be as in section 2 and let K be a fixed theory of  L. In 
this section, forcing will always be taken relative to K. 
Let M be a structure for L and let <A, G) be an assignment of con- 
stants to M. M is said to be K-gener ic  if 3.1 and 3.2 hold: 
3.1. M is consistent with K: i.e., every finite P c D(M) is a condit ion 
relative to K. 
3.2. For every sentence so of L(A), M P so if and only if there is a 
finite P c_ D(M) such that P II- so. 
It follows from 2, 1 7 that this notion is independent of the assignment 
(A, G} used. Note that by 2.15, if 3.1 holds then in order to show that 
3.2 holds it is sufficient o show that for any sentence -1 so of  L(A), if 
M I = -7 so then there is a P C D(M) such that P I~- -3 so. This observation 
often simplifies the task of  showing tha: a specific structure is K-generic. 
We say that our language L is count, able if it has at most a countable 
number of relation, function and cohstant symbols. 
3.3. Theorem. I f  L is" countab le  then fo r  any  theory  K o f  L there is a 
coul~tabte K-gener ic  mode l  M. Moreover ,  fo r  any  cond i t ion  P relm~ive to 
K,  M can be chosen  so that  P c_ D(M). 
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Proof. The proof parallels that fi'om set theory. Let A be a countable 
infinite set o f  constant symbols not in L so that L(A) ~ k' and Such 
that P is a set o f  sentences of  L(A). Enumerate all sentences o f  L(A) by 
an w-sequence ¢ l ,  ~2 . . . .  , ~,~, . . . .  We def ine an increasing sequence 
P0 c_ P1 c_ ... c_ Pn c_ ... f rom C(K, A)  by induct ion  on n as fol lows: 
P0 =P"  
Given P , ,  if Pn IF- -3 %; + l we let 
P,;~l 
[P  u{- I%,+l  } i f¢, ;+l  i sa tomic ,  
t P~ i f%~. l  is not  a tomic  . 
(This is a cond i t ion  by 2.9.) Otherwise,  there is an extens ion  Q ~ P~ 
such that  Q ~ C(K, A)  and Q I1-- ¢n+l .  We let P ,+ l  be some such Q. 
Note that  in this case, if ~,~ + l is atomic  then ~,~ + l is automat ica l ly  in 
P,~ ~ l • Hence for  every a tomic  sentence so, exact ly  one o f  ¢ and -7 ,; is in 
UnP n . Also note  that  lbr  every sentence v', exact ly  one o f¢  and -I ¢ is 
forced by some P,,~ Define an equivalence relat ion ~ on closed terms o f  
L(A ) by: 
t I ~ t 2 if and oP, ly if (t I = t 2) E UP  , 
and let [t] be tile equiva lence class o f  .;". Our  s t ructure  M = <M, F> is 
now def ined in the obv iovs  way.  The universe M is the set o f  It] for t 
a closed term of  L(A). Fo;" any constant  symbo l  c o f  L, c M = [c] .  Given 
an n-ary funct ion  symbo l  f o f  L, define.fM by: 
fM( [ t l  l . . . . .  I t ,  l )  = [ f ( t  I , ..., t , , ) l  • 
It is easy to check that  this is well defi~3ed. Given an n-ary re lat ion sym- 
bol R and closed terms t I ... t n , we let" 
¢ [ t l ] ,  ..., I t , , l>c  R M iff P,(t 1 ... t )e  U,P , ,  . 
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This is also well defined, as is again easy to check. Now K w P, is con- 
sistent for each n so K u U ,P ,  is consistent and hence M is consistent 
with K. To show 3 2 we must first choose an assignment to M. Let 
G(a) = [al for each a 6 A. Then (A, G) is an assignment to M. To check 
3.2 it suffices to st~ow that for each sentence ¢ of L(A), 
M~, :  if and only if P,~ II--~ for somen.  
This is routine by induction on ~ using the fact that for each ~, one of 
and -I .~ is forced by some P,~. 
A model M of a theory K' completes  K' if M is an elementary sub- 
structure of every model M' of K' containing M as substructure. Given 
an assignment (A, G> to M, this is equivalent to the statement that 
K w D(M) is a complete theory in the language L(A). The theory K' is 
mt~del complete  if every model of K' completes K'. 
F, ecall that K r, the forcing companion of K, is the set of all sentences 
of L weakly forced by ~. Thus, every K-generic model is a model of KT. 
The converse is not in general true. 
3.4. Theorem. A model  M of K. t" is K-gener ic  i f  and  on ly  i f  M completes  
K~ ~. 
Proof. Let us first show that if M is K-generic then M completes K.t'. Let 
M c_ M' where M' D Kf. Iet  (A ,  G> be an assignment to M and extend it 
to an assignment (A', G'> to M'. Let ~ be a sentence of L(A) which is 
true in M. We wish to show that M' ~ ~. Since M is K-generic there is a 
p c_ D(M) such that P II- ~. Then, since M' I = K:, M' D ~0 by 2.20. 
Now assume that M completes K:; that is, that Kf u D(M)is com- 
plete in L(.4). Let ~ be a sentence of L(A) such that M ~ -I ~. We have 
to show ~hat some P c_ D(M) forces --1 ~. For P, choose a finite subset of 
D(M) such that K r u P ~- -1 ~0. Suppose P does not force --1 ~o. Thus, there 
is a condition Q 9 P such that Q It- ~. We claim that K: u Q w { ~0 } is 
consistent. If not, then K: t- 'q x l  ... x,, [ AQ(x  I ... Xn) ~ "q , :(x I ... xn)], 
where we have replaced all constants of L ' - L  in Q and : by the distinct 
free variables x I .-. x , .  On the other hand, 
K~ 1.-- Vx  I ... x n [ A Q(x  I ... x n) -* ~o(x 1 ... x,~ )] by 2.20 and hence 
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K[ )-- -1 3x  I ... x n AQ(x 1 ... xn). But Kf[Q] is consistent by 2.13, • 
Kf[Q] ~- ~Ix 1 ... x n AQ(x  I ... x , )  and Kf  c_ K.t'IQI is consistem. But 
this contradicts the fact that KI u P t-- --i ¢ and P _c Q. Note that if L is 
countable we can simplify the proof that Kf u Q u {~ } is consistent 
by taking a K-generic model  M' with Q ~ D(M'), by 3.3. 
3.5. Corollary. Kf is mode l  complete  i f  and on ly  i f  every mode l  o f  Kf  is 
K-generic. 
An V 3 -formula is one of the form 
VYl "'" Ym ¢(Xl "'" xn 'Y l  "'" Ym ) 
where ~p is an existential formula. 
3.6. Theorem. Let  M be K-generic and  Dt M ~ M' where  M' is cons is tent  
w i th  K. For  any V zl - formula ¢(.v I ... x n ) and any a I ... a n E M, it" 
M' D ¢[a I ... a,,] then M ~ ¢[a I ... a,,]. 
Tiffs generalizes 3.5 of [6] to non-countable K.
Proof. Let ¢ be 'q'Yl ..-Ym q ' (X l  "'" Xn ,  Y l  "'" ) ' , ,1) and let b~ . . .  b,n E M. 
Assuming M' D .~[a 1 ... a n ] we need to see that M D q, [a I ... an, 
b 1 ... b m ]__. Let us write h i for some term of L(A) denoting a i and simi- 
larly for b i. If M D -1 q,(Zi I ... an, t~i "" l~,n) then there is a P c D(M) 
such that P it-- -1 q,(a I ... ~,,, bl ..- bin)" But M' ~ *(h- I ... ~,,, b 1 ... -lJ m) 
so there is a Q ~ D(M) such that Q 1~- q'(i i l  ... an, [~l "" -bin)" by 2.16. 
But then P u Q is a condit ion (since M' is consistent with K) forcing 
both q, (a 1 ... a n , b I ... bm ) and its negation. 
The following result is sometimes useful for showing that a model is 
K-generic. A pr imi t ive  formula is one of the form 
:::]Y 1 "'" ::]Ym qj (X 1 . . . .  Vn '  y 1 "" Ym ) ' 
where q, is a conjunction of atomic and negated atomic formulas. 
3.7. Theorem. Let  M 0 C ;d I such that  Jbr  any pr imi t ive  fo rmula  
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~(x I ... x,,) ofL  and any ct I ... a,, ~ M 0, (t'M~ ~ ~o[a I ... a,,] then 
M o I = ¢[a 1 ... a , ] . / fM  1 is K-generic theft M o is K-generic. 
Proof. Let (Ao. G o) be an assignment of constants to M o for which 
every a e M o is equal to G(c) for infinitely many c ~ A o. Extend 
(A o, Go) to an assignment (A 1, G1) to ~ 1 • Let us first show that for 
any sentence ¢ of L(A); if M 1 l = ~o then there is a condit ion Po c_ D(Mo) 
such that P0 11--- ¢. Since M l is K-generic, if M l ~ ~o then there is a 
p c_ D(M) such that P It- ¢. Let q,(c I ... c m) be the conjunct ion of tht. 
formulas in P. where c I ... c m :~re the constants from A l - Ao occurring 
in P. By the hypothesis of the ~.heorem :here are b I ... b m ~ M 0 such 
that M 0 ~ q, [b o ... bin]. Let ?i be the name of b i from A 0 which does 
not appear in P or ,~ and let Po be the r~'sult of replacing ci by ci for 
i = 1 ... m. Then P0 !?- ~ and Po _c D(M ~. To finish the proof  we show 
that Z(M o) (see 2.14) is the set of all fcrmulas of  L. By 2.15, it suffices 
to show that ~ ~ Y-. implies --1 ¢ ~ Z. For this it suffices to show that 
M o ,~ "-1 ¢(t~ ... t,~) implies Po It- --1 ~(t~ ... t , )  for some 1°o c_ D(Mo) ' 
since the proof in the other direction is immediate. By the fact just 
proved, it suffices to show that M~ ~ -7 ~(t 1 ... t,~). If not, then there is 
ap  o c D(M0 ) such that P0 It-- ~(t 1 ... t , )  and hence M o ~ ~0(t~ ... t , )  
since ¢ ~ E (Mo). This contradict ion finishes the proof. 
3.8. Theorem. The class (~f K-generic structures is closed t,nder unions 
o f  chmns. 
Proof. Let M = U a< x Mo~ where Ma is K-generic and Mo~ c Mo~+l for 
each a less than the limit ordinal ;~. M is consistent with K since each 
Ma is consistent with K. By 3.4, Mo~-< Mc~+i for all o: < ;~ so Mc~ < M 
for each e < ~. Let M ~ ~ where ~ is a sentence of  L(A). (A, G) being 
an assignment to M. Then Mo~ ~ ~9 for some ~ < ;~ so there is a 
P ~ D(Ma) c_ D(M) such that P It- ¢. By earlier remarks, ~t follows that 
M is K-generic. 
When is the class of  all K-generic models an elementary class'? If L is 
countable then this question is answered by the fol lowing and 3.5. 
3.9. I f  L is countable then Kf  is the set o f  sentetwes o f  L true iit a!l K- 
generic models. 
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Proof. We need only show that if ¢ q~ K.t then -1 so is true in some K- 
generic model. If so q~ Kf  then there is a condit ion P such that P It-- q so. 
Using 3.3, there is a K-generic model M with P G D(M). Then M ~ -1 ~; 
by 3.2. 
3.10. Corollary. I f  L is countable then the class of  K-generic models is 
an elementary class (variety) i f  and only i f  K f  is model complete. 
4. Forcing companions and forcing completions 
If K is a subset of  its forcing companion K;  then K[ is called the 
lbrcing completion of K. K is called forc#zg-~'omplete if K is logically 
equivalent to K¢. In this section we wish to investigate the relationship 
between a theory K and its forcing companion K£. 
Let K 1 and K 2 be theories of L. K 2 is model consistent relative to K l 
if every model of  K l is consistent with K 2 . I( 1 and K 2 are mutually 
model consistent if each is model consistent relative to the other. It is 
easily seen that K 2 is model consistent relative to K I if and only if 
(K2) V G (K 1 ),q. 
4.1. Theorem. l.~r any theory K of  L, K and Kf  are mutually model 
consistent. 
Proof. Let us; first show that (K-t),q c_ KV. By 2.11, if Kf I- so then 
4~ IH* so. Suppose that so is -1 q, where q, is existential. Thus q~ IH --I xp by 
2.11, and hence K I-- so by 2.18. Rather than show directly that 
K V c (K f )v  ' we establish the following result which implies this rela- 
tionship. 
By KV3 we mean the set of  V:l-sentences soof L such that K i- so. 
4.2. Theorem. f~brany K, KV::IG K[. 
Proof. By 2.12 it suffices to show that if K V- 7 :Ix I ... 3x  n 
-1 q;(x I ... x n ) where q, is existential then ¢ II-- -1 Bx I ... :Ix n 
q q,(x I ... Xn). If not, then there is a condit ion P and closed terms 
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:l ... !,, of L' such that P If- -I q,(t I ... t,,). But then K u P t- 
'1 q,(t~ ... t,~) by 2.18. Since V u P is consistent so is 
K u { q q,(t I ... t,,)}, which is a contradiction. 
• ¢.3. Corollary. Let K l and K 2 be theories of  L. 
(1) I.f K l and K 2 are ,nutually model consistent then K{ = KJ2, and a 
model M is K 1 generic i f  and only i f  it is K2-generic. 
(2) ('om,erseh,, if (K 3).r= (K2)/ then K 1 and K 2 are mutually model 
consisten t.
(3) It" K 2 is model consistent relatire to K 1 then K 1 is model consistent 
• 2 
relalh'e tO K{. 
~oof .  if K~ and K 2 are mutually model consistent then (K 1),q 
so ( i )  follows from 2.19. (2) is immediate from 4.1 as is (3). 
=(K2) v 
4.4. Corollary. Given any model M 0 o f  K] there is a model M 1 of  K and 
a model M 2 of  Kf  such that M 0 C M i _C M 2 and M 0 -< M 2. 
Proof. hnmediate from 4.2 and Theorem 3.4.3 of  Robinson [5]. 
4.5. Corollary. For any K, Kf is forcing-complete; i.e., (K J ) /=  K:. 
Proof. Immediate from 4.1 and 4.3.1. 
We say that K has tile joint embedding property if any two models 
M 1 and M 2 of K can be embedded in a common model M of K. The fol- 
lowing tlaeorem is 5.3 of 16]. 
4.6. Theorem. K has the joint embedding property if and only if K f  is a 
complete theory o f  L. 
4.7. Corollary. A forcing-complete heory is complete if and only i f  it 
has the joint embedding property. 
We say that a theory K is induct ive if the class of its models is closed 
under unions of chains. A well known theorem of Chang-Log-Suszko 
states that every inductive theory is logically equivalent to a set K' of 
V~l-sentences. 
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4.8. Theorem. I f  K is mutually model consistent with an inductive 
theory K' then K' ~ K/. Thus° i lK  is inductive thet: K c KJ. 
Proof. Immediate from K r= (K')f  and 4.2 using the ('hang-Log-Suszko 
Theorem. We could avoid appeal to this theorem by using Corollary 4.4. 
In [31, Kaiser shows that if for a given theory K there is an inductive 
theory K' with K c K' and K' model consistent relative to K then there 
is a largest such K', i.e., one that contains all others. He calls this set, 
when it exists, the inductive hull of K. From 4.8 we see that if K has an 
inductive hull K' then K' _c_ K.c. We shall see in the next section that K f 
need not be inductive, even if K is, so that in general Kt may properly 
contain K'. 
We close this section by considering the questio~i: what kind of theo- 
ries can occur as forcing companions? In view of earlier results, this is 
equivalent to asking for a necessary and sufficient condit ion for a 
theory to be forcing complete. We have shown that if L is corn,table 
and K is forcing complete then for any sentence ~ of L consistent with 
K there is a model M of K and ¢ such that M completes K; i.e. K u D(M) 
is complete. This condit ion is also sufficient. The result was established 
it, a discussion with Ed Fisher. 
4.9. Theorem. Let K be ~mv theory in a language L such that]or eveo' 
sentet~ce ~ of  L, (t" K w {¢} is consistent then there is a model M o f  
K u { ¢ } such that M completes K. Then K is forcing complete. 
Proof. It follows from the hypothesis that if ¢ is a sentence of the ex- 
pansion L' of L such that K u {~} is consistent then there is a model M 
of K which completes K and an assignment <A, G) to M such that 
¢ ~ L(A) and ~ is true in M. The same holds for any finite set of sen- 
to,ices of L'. We first show by induction on formulas of L that for all 
models M of K which complete K, ¢ ~ Y.(M). It will follow that all such 
models are K-generic. By 2.15 it suffices to show that i f¢  ~ E(M) for 
all such M then -I ¢ e X(M) for all such M. So let M be a model of  K 
wh:ch completes K. If P II-- -1 ¢(t I ... t,z) for some P ~ D(M) thon clearly 
~(t 1 ... t n) cannot hold in M since ~ ~ Z(M). So suppose 
M [= ] ~(t 1 ... tn). Since M completes K there is a finite subset P c_ D(M) 
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such that K to P I-- -1 so(t I .... t,~). We can assume that all c3nstants of 
t I ... t,, occur in P. We claim that P It-- -1 so(q ... t,,). If not, then there is 
a condit ion Q _~ P such that Q It-- so(t I ... in). Let M* be a model of  K 
which completes K such that for some assignment (A *, G*), Q c L(A *) 
and all sentences of Q are true in M*. M* D ~(t I ... t , )  since so ~ ~(M*)  
but M* ~ -1 so(t I ... t,,) since M* is a model of K to P and 
K to P I-- -1 so(t 1 ... tn). Thus, all models M of K which complete K are 
K-generic. Now, if so ~ K[ then some condit ion Q forces -1 so. Let M be a 
model of K to Q which completes K. Then M is K-generic so M ~- -1 
and hence ¢ is not a logical consequence of K. For the converse, sup- 
pose that so is not a logical consequence of K. Thus there is a K-generic 
model M which is a model of q so and hence so cannot be in K¢. Hence K 
is logically equivalent to Kf. 
4.10. Corollary. I f  K is complete then a sufficient condition jbr K to be 
./brcing complete is that there exists a model M o f  K which completes K. 
l f  K is a complete theory in a countable language then this condition is 
also necessao'. 
5. Examples of forcing companions and generic models 
Given a theory K, we say that a theory K' of L is a model compunion 
of K if 5.1 and 5.2 hold: 
5~1. K and K' are mutually model consistewt; 
5.2. K' is model complete. 
"['his definition, for which we are indebted to Eli Bers, is a generaliza- 
tion of model complet ion since a model complet ion of K is always a 
model companion of K, but a model companion K' of K need not be a 
model completion of K, even when K c_ K'. 
5.3. Theorem. I f  K 1 and K 2 are model companions of  K then K 1 and 
K 2 are logically equivalent. 
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Proof.  Since K 1 and K 2 are mutua l ly  model  consisteot with K they are 
mutual ly  model  consistent with each other. Let us show that every 
model  M o f  K l is a model  o f  K 2. Define a chain 
M ! -CM 2 _=_ ..._c Mn G ... 
o f  models  by 
M 1 =M 
and, for n > 0, 
M2n = some model  o f  K 2 extending M2, - l ' 
M2n+l = some model  o f  K l extending M2, . 
Since K l and K 2 are model  complete,  the chains 
MI C_ M3 c ... c_ M2n+ 1 _c ... 
and 
M2 c_ M4 c_ ... _c M2n G ... 
are e lementary chains so that U .M.  is a model  of  K 2 and an e lementary 
extension of  M 1 = M. Thus M p K 2. 
5.4. Corollary. ]j'a theory K has a model-companion K' then K' is logi- 
cally equivalent to the ]brcing companion K /o f  K. 
Proof. Since K' is model  complete,  it is inductive, so K' c_ Kf  by 4.8. 
Henc~ K~ is model  complete  so K' and Kf are logically equivalent by 
5.3. 
5.5. Theorem. A theory K is model complete (land only if every model 
of  K is K-generic. 
Proof. If M 1 and M 2 are K-generic and M l c M 2 then M l -< M 2 by 
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Theorem 3.4. Thus, i5 every model of K is K-generic then K is model 
complete. Conversely, if K is model complete then K is a model com- 
panion of itself and hence K is logically equivalent to K t so the resut~ 
follows from 3.5 
5.6. Corollary. Every model complete theory is.lbrcing complete. 
As a simple example, let K 1 be the theory of linearly ordered sets 
without first elements. Let K 2 be the theory of linearly ordered sets 
with first element. K 1 and K 2 are mutually model consistent so 
K.[ = K~. l.et K be the theory of densely ordered sets without fi~'st or 
last elements. Then K l and K are mutually model consistent and K is 
model complete, so KJ 0 = K{ is logically equiva[ent to K. Thus K is a 
model companion to both K 1 and K 2. Since K is not consistent with 
K 2, K is certainly not the model completion of K 2 . Hence K 2 has no 
model completion, 
Notice that if a theory K has both an inductive hull K 1 and a model 
companion K2 then K 1 = Kf and K 2 is logical!y equivalent to K 1 so 
that in this case all three notions (forcing completion, model companion 
and inductive hull) coincide. 
We now turn to a forcing complete theory which is very far from 
being model complete. Let L be the language wMch has only two 
3-place relation symbols S and P, no functioa symbols or constant sym- 
bols. Let N be the set of natural numbers and let N = (N, S, P) where S 
and P are the relations x + y = z and x • y = z respectively. 
5.7. Theorem. Let l( = K N be the set of'all sentences o f  L true #~ N. 
( 1 ) N is K-generic. 
~2) K is forcing complete; i.e., K = Kf. 
(3) N is, up to isomorphism, the only K-generic model. 
Proof. Since K is complete and N is a model of K which completes K, 
K is forcing complete by 4.10. (1) follows by Theorem 3.4. It follows 
t'rom Theorem 5 of Rabin [4] that N is the only model of K which 
completes K and hence (3) is also a consequence of Theorem 3.4. 
Let K N be the set of sentences true in N and let K 0 ~ K N be any set 
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containing all of (K N)V. Then we know thai: Ko/= K N and N is the only 
'~K K0-generic model. This provides an example of an inductive set  y ~V 
whose forcing completion is not inductive. 
Theorem 5.7 also shows that there is ::o simple upward Lowenheim- 
Skolen Theorem for K-generic models. On the other hand, there is a 
downward Lowenheim-Skolen Theorem for K-generic models ince any 
elementary submodel of a K-generic model is K-generic, by Theorem 
3.7. 
We note in passing the following related result: Given a theory K in a 
language of cardinality K and given a model M of K which completes K, 
then for any infinite subset X c_ M of cardinality k > K there is an ele- 
mentary submodel M 0 of M of cardinality ~, with X c M 0 such that M 0 
completes K. There is no corresponding "upward" result. 
5.8. Theorem. Let L be a language a~ld suppose that M is a structure for 
L such tha.: every element of  M is denoted by some clo~ea' term of  L. 
Let K = K M be the set o f  all sentences of  L true in M. Then M is K- 
generic and K is jbrcing complete. 
Proof. hnmediate from 4.10. 
6. A LiSwenheim-Skolem theorem for forcing 
Given a theory K we have only shown the existence of :t K-generic 
structure in the case where K is countable, or where every model of Kf 
is K-generic. On the other hand, we have seen that there is very little 
difference between countable and uncountable theories when it comes 
to results which do not mention K-generic structures. This is explained 
to some extent by the following result which allows one to pass from 
an uncountable theory K to a countable subtheory K,. 
6.1. Theorem. Let L be an uncountable language, L(A ) a normal ex- 
pansion of  L and L 0 a countable sublanguage o f  L. Given any theor.v K 
of  L there is a sublanguage L, of  L and a countable infinite subset A ,  
of  A such that the following hold, where K, is the set of  sentences 
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~ bi~ in the language L, :  
(1 ~ L o c L,.  
(2) F~>r any sentence so o f  L,,  i fK  t-- so then K, I-- so. 
(3) For any finite set P oj basic sentences o f  L , (A ,), P is a condition 
relative to K 6rand only if  P is a condition relative to K,.  We de- 
note this set o f  conditions by C, (K , ,  A ,). 
(4) For any P ~ C, (K , .  A , )  and auy seHtem'e so o f  L,(A ,) ,  P It-- so ill 
L , (A , )  relative to K,  ~f and only if  P I~- ¢ in L(A)relative to K. 
(5) .4 sentence so o f  L,  is in K.r ( tand only if  so is in (K , ) f ,  hence, i f  
and only ~t'so is true in all K,-generic models. 
Proof. Since (3) is a consequence of (2) and (5) is a consequence of (4) 
we need not consider these coqdit ions further. L,.-t K 0 be the set of sen- 
tences of so 6 K formulated in L 0 and let A 0 be a countable infinite sub- 
set of A. We are going to define inductively a sequence L 0 _,7=. L l c_ ... 
c_ L n c_ ... of countable sublanguages of L and a sequence A 0 c A ~ c ... 
c_ An _c ... of countable subsets of A, We use K, for the set of sen- 
tences 6 K formulated in L,, and C(K n, A n) for the set of all condit ions 
in L,,(A,,) relative to K,,. Given L, and An+ 1 we let L,~+l be any count- 
able sublanguage of L containing L~ and satisfying 6 .2 -6 .4  and we let 
A,z+l be a countable subset o fA containingA,~ and satisfying 6.3 and 
6.4. 
6.2. For each sentence ¢ of L, .  if K t- so choose a finite subset S(SO) of  
K such that S(SO) t- so. For each such so and each q, ~ S(SO), q, is in the 
language L,~ + 1 • 
6.3. For each P ~ C(K n , A n) al~d each sentence ::1 x ~0(x) of L,~ (A n) such 
that Pc  C(K, A) and P It-- 3x  so(x), choose a closed term t of L(A) such 
that P II-- so(t). There are at most a countable number of terms chosen in 
this way. Every constant symbol in such a term is to be in L, +l or 
A~+I and every f lmction symbol is to be in Ln+ 1 . 
6.4. For each P ~ C(K n , An) and each sentence -1 so of L,~ (A n) such that 
P c C(K, A) but P does not force --i so in L(A) choose an extension 
Q _3 p, Q ~ C(K, A) such that Q It-- ~ in L(A) relative to K. All non- 
logical symbols in Q are to be in L,~+I(A,~ + 1). 
Now let L ,  = U,, L, and A ,  = LInA n . Then K,  = U, K n . We need only 
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check that (2) and (4). lf~0 is a sentence of L,  and K t- ~ then by 6.2 
Kn+ 1 t- ¢ where n is chosen so that ~ is in L n. Hence K, t- ~. We show 
that (4) is satisfied by induction on the complexity of sentences ~ of 
L,(A ,). If ~0 is atomic this is immediate. If (4) hold for ~ and q, then it 
clearly holds for (~0 ,\ q,) and (¢ v q,). Suppose that ~ is :Ix q,(x) and 
that Pc  C, (K , ,  A,) .  I fP  It- ,¢ in L*(A*) relative to K* then P It- q,(t) 
in L , (A , )  relative to K,, for some closed term t of L,(A ,). By induc- 
tion, P It- q' (t) in L(A) relative to K and hence P It- ~ in L(A) relative 
to K. Suppose for the converse that P It- ¢ in L(A) relative to K. Choose 
n so that ~ e L n and P~ C(K n, An). Then by 6.3 there is a closed term 
t of L n + 1 (A n + l ) such that P It-- q' (t) in L(A ) relative to K and hence, by 
induction, in L , (A , )  relative to K,. Suppose finally that ~ is -3 q, and 
tZ~,~t PE C, (K , ,  A,) .  l fP  does not force vo in L , (A , )  relative to K, 
then there is a Q E C, (K , ,  A , )  such that P ~ Q and Q It- q' in L,(A ,)  
relative to K,. By induction, Q it- g; in L(A) relative to K so P does not 
force .¢ in L(A } relative to K. For the converse suppose that P does not 
force ~ in L(A) relative to K. Choose n as in the previous case, there is 
by 6.4 a condition Q c C(K, A) defined in Ln+ 1 (An+ l ) such that 
Q tt- xp in L(A) relative to K, so in L,(A,)relat ive to K,, and P C Q. 
But then P does not force ~ in L , (A , )  relative to K,. 
7. Applications 
7.1. Suppose that L is countable and K is an inductive theory of L, all 
of whose models are infinite. It is known (see Chang-Keisler [2] ) that 
if K is categorical in some infinite cardinal K then K is model complete, i 
For the case K = w, this is a simple consequence of 3.4. Let M be any 
cbuntable K-generic model. Since K is inductive, M b K. But then any 
countable model of K is K-generic, since they are a!l isomorphic, and 
hence K is model complete. This argument has been extended to • > co 
by E.Fisher (unpublished). 
7.2. In Robinson [5], there is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
an inductive theory K to have a model completion. We give here a 
I Added in proof." This is a theorem of  LindstriSm, Theoria, voL 30 ¢ t964) pp. 183-  196, 
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necessary and suff icient Condit ion for an inductive theory K to have a 
mode l -companion ,  or equivalently in view of  5.4, for K f  to be mode~- 
complete.  For  simplicity we restrict ourselves to the case where L is 
countable.  
Theorem.  Let K be an inducti~,e set o f  sentences in a countable language 
L. "the jbl lowing condition is necessary attd sufficient for  K:  to be 
model complete: .lbr every existential formula so(x I ... x~) o f  L there is 
a univers ,l formula q, (x I ... x , )  o tL  such tliat jbr every model  M o f  K 
there is a:z extension M' o f  M which is a model o f  K and o f  
Vx  I ... Vx~[so(x! ... x )~ ~ ~(x  I ... x,~)] . 
Proof. St~pposc that K.t is model  co~ te. Let so(x 1 ... x n) be an exist- 
ential formula o f  L. Since K :  is mo¢ )mplete there is a universal 
formula q,(x 1 .... ~'n) such that K /~ Vx  I ... Vx ,  [so(x 1 ... x n) 
~ q,(x I ... x , ) ]  so the necessity of  the condit ion fol lows f rom the fact 
that K c- K :  and that K :  is model  consistent relative to K. Now suppose 
that the condi t ion is satisfied and let us show thet K :  is model  com- 
plete. For  this purpose,  it suffices to show that for any existential  
so(x! ... x,,) there is a universal q,(x I ... a'n) such that 
K./k- Vx l  ... Vx,, [SO(x! ... x n) ~ q,(x 1 ... xn)]. Given so, choose q/ by 
the condi t ion of  the theorem. We show that 'qx 1 ... Vx ,  [so ,-~ q, ] is 
true in every K-generic model  M. Extend M to a mode l  M' o f  
K u [ Vx I ... Vx ,  [¢ ~ q, l ]. But since the sentence in quest ion is 
equivalent o an 'q~t-sentence, it must  hold in M by 3.6. 
8. Open questions 
8. I. Are there a~j: unc~mntable theories K fo~ which no K-generic 
models exist? 
8.2. What is the lbrcing companion o f  Peano arithmetic? 
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8.3. Under what  mode l  theoret ic  cond i t ions  on K can we assert that 
every model ,  or ever), countab le  mode l  o f  K can be embedded h~ a K- 
generic mode l?  Suppose, for example, that K is inductive. Then every 
model of K can be embedded in a model M of K which is algebraically 
closed in the sense that if M c_ M', M' p K then for any primitive 
~(Xl ...xn) and anya  I . . .a  n ~ M, ifM' p ¢[a 1 ...a,t] then 
M P ~o [a I ... a,~l. Every K-generic model is algebraically closed by Theo- 
rem 3.6. If M could be embedded in a K-generic model, then M would 
itself be K-generic. Thus, if K is inductiw~ and every model of K can be 
embedded in a K-generic model then the K-generic models are exactly 
the algebraically closed models of K. For K = the theory of groups, 
P.Eklof and G.Sabbagh ave shown that the notion of algebraically 
closed groups is not first order. Since Kf is complete, if every algebra- 
ically closed group were generic they would all be elementary equiva- 
lent. 
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